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Notes
Regulating Geoengineering:
Applications of GMO Trade and
Ocean Dumping Regulation
ABSTRACT

Geoengineering-the deliberate, large-scale manipulation
of the environment-is being increasingly considered as an
emergency solution to curb global warming, as efforts to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions have largely proved inadequate. This
Note explores one form of proposed geoengineering: solar
radiation management, which contemplates spraying reflective
particles into the stratosphere to cause a global cooling effect.
Geoengineering presents many challenges to regulators because
of its potential to cause trans-boundaryharm, its relative ease of
enactment, and its unknown nature. Current international
environmental treaties do not address geoengineering and
would likely inadequately regulate it. But premature
multilateral geoengineering regulations, if agreed to by states,
would likely stifle geoengineering research. Instead, norms
surroundinggeoengineeringmust be developed by researchersat
the forefront of the field before these new standards are codified
into multinational treaties. This Note looks to international
GMO trade and ocean dumping regulationsfor inspirationas to
how future multinationalgeoengineeringregulation could work.
Principles and institutions from these regulations-including
the polluter pays principle, a mandatory permit system, and
research and monitoring systems-should be incorporated into
future internationalgeoengineering regulations once adequate
norms surrounding the substantive research of geoengineering
are established.
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I. INTRODUCTION

As efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions look increasingly
inadequate, scientists have begun to consider geoengineering-the
deliberate, large-scale manipulation of the environment-as an
emergency solution to curb anthropogenic climate change. 1
Geoengineering presents many challenges for international law,
mostly because of its unknown nature, relative ease of enactment by
a single state or entity, and likelihood of causing trans-boundary

1.
See INT'L PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, MEETING REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL
ON
CLIMATE
CHANGE
EXPERT
MEETING
ON
GEOENGINEERING 10 (2012) [hereinafter IPCC EXPERT MEETING ON GEOENGINEERING];
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 SYNTHESIS

REPORT SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS 77 (2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdflassessmentreport/ar5/syr/SYRAR5_FINALfullwcover.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WR8M-YH96]
(archived Oct. 12, 2017) [hereinafter IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT] ("Without additional
mitigation efforts beyond those in place today, and even with adaption, warming by the
end of the 21st century will lead to high to very high risk of severe, widespread and
irreversible impacts globally."); see also Jesse Reynolds, The InternationalRegulation
of Climate Engineering:Lessons from Nuclear Power, 26 J. ENvT'L L. 271 (2014) (noting
proposals for climate engineering as responses to climate change).
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effects. 2 These challenges also raise ethical and social questions
beyond the scope of geoengineering's technical feasibility.3
There are two main categories of geoengineering: Carbon Dioxide
Removal (CDR) and Solar Radiation Management (SRM). 4 CDR
proposals envision removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and
storing it underground or in the ocean. 5 Examples of CDR
technologies include carbon capture and storage, 6 enhanced
weathering strategies, 7 and direct air capture. 8 Proposed SRM
techniques aim to reduce the amount of solar radiation absorbed by
the Earth by increasing the reflectivity of the Earth's surface or by
imitating the global cooling effect caused by volcanic eruptions by
spraying reflective participles into the stratosphere.9 This technique
would increase the reflectivity of clouds by sowing them with
seawater droplets.1 0 This Note focuses on regulating SRM due to the
dilemma it presents to regulators: SRM is cheaper and faster acting
than CDR, but risks causing further environmental harm to the
planet." Unilateral SRM implementation could affect precipitation

2.
See generally David G. Victor, On the Regulation of Geoengineering, 24
OXFORD REV. OF EcoN. POL'Y, 322-36 (2008); see also Reynolds, supra note 1, at 272
(discussing the environmental and social risks of geoengineering).
See generally Adam Corner et al., Perceptions of Geoengineering: Public
3.
Attitudes, Stakeholder Perspectives, and the Challenge of 'Upstream' Engagement, 5
WILEY INTERDISc. REV.: CLIMATE CHANGE, 451-66 (2012).

4.
5.

Reynolds, supranote 1, at 271.
See id.

6.

What

is

CCS?,

CARBON

CAPTURE

AND

STORAGE

ASS'N,

12,
2017).
visited
Oct.
(last
http://www.cesassociation.org/what-is-ccs/
[https://perma.cc/9ZQY-QA28] (archived Oct. 10, 2017) (carbon capture and storage is a
technology that captures CO 2 produced from the use of fossil fuels and stores it
underground, preventing it from entering the atmosphere).

7.
Letter from Taylor et al., to Nature Climate Change (Dec. 14, 2017),
http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/v6/n4/full/nclimate2882.html?WT.feed-name=
subjects-climate-change-mitigation [https://perma.cc/BZ5A-UTVD] (archived Oct. 10,
2017) (subscription required). Enhanced weathering techniques contemplate
distributing pulverized silicate rocks across the ocean floor and on land to speed up the
carbon cycle, locking up carbonates in the process.
For a discussion of CDR methods and their potential effects, see A. NEIL
8.
CRAIK & WILLIAM C.G. BURNS, CLIMATE ENGINEERING UNDER THE PARIS AGREEMENT 2

(2016); see also Christa Marshall, In Switzerland, a Giant Machine is Sucking Carbon
10:30
AM),
1,
2017,
SCIENCE
(June
the
Air,
Directly
From
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/06/switzerland-giant-new-machine-suckingcarbon-directly-air [https://perma.cc/4AVA-3D9E] (archived Oct. 10, 2017). Direct air
capture involves removing carbon dioxide directly from the air through a filtering and
heating process.
Reynolds, supra note 1, at 271; see also IPCC EXPERT MEETING ON
9.
GEOENGINEERING, supra note 1, at 10.

CRAIK & BURNS, supra note 8, at 2. For a more detailed discussion of SRM
10.
methods, see William C.G. Burns, Geoengineering the Climate: An Overview of Solar
Radiation Management Options, 46 TULSA L. REV. 283 (2012).
Reynolds, supra note 1, at 271 (explaining that SRM is "relatively fast,
11.
inexpensive, and high risk," while CDR is "relatively slow, expensive, and low risk").
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patterns in other regions and "may not appropriately address the
global scale" of climate change.' 2
One of the major political, ethical, and legal challenges of
regulating'SRM is that scientists believe it could disparately impact
global temperatures and precipitation levels, potentially causing
negative side effects in some regions of the world.' 3 Geoengineering,
because of its relatively inexpensive nature, provides states with the
opportunity to act unilaterally in ways that may therefore disparately
impact other states.1 4 For example, SRM deployed in one country
could unevenly alter global temperature and precipitation levels in
other regions of the world, impacting other regions' ecosystems,
agriculture, and industries.' 5 Another challenge is that if SRM efforts
were to be deployed and then discontinued, climate change would
likely accelerate far beyond its current trajectory. 16 One estimate
warns that, failing to sustain geoengineering, once implemented,
could result in global warming at a pace twenty times greater than
today. '7
Currently, there are no international laws that explicitly
regulate geoengineering. 18 While geoengineering would likely lie
within the purview of several international environmental treaties,
including the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), the Paris Agreement, the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Kyoto Protocol, the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and the Environmental
Modification Convention (ENMOD), these existing treaties would
inadequately
regulate
geoengineering. 19 Existing
regulatory
frameworks would at most regulate geoengineering intended as a
weapon and would not prohibit geoengineering research aimed at
reducing harm to humans and the environment. 20
A comprehensive regulatory framework must be enacted
eventually to ensure that states adequately research, coordinate, and
exercise mutual restraint before enacting geoengineering. Without

12.

IPCC EXPERT MEETING ON GEOENGINEERING, supra note 1, at 10.

13.
CRAIK & BURNS, supra note 8, at 2 (noting that changes to average
temperature would not be uniform, "imperiling food production in some regions of the
world").

14.

Victor, supra note 2.

15.

CRAIK & BURNS, supra note 8.

16.
IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 1, at 89 ("Additionally, if SRM were
increased to substantial levels and then terminated, there is high confidence that
surface temperatures would rise very rapidly (within a decade or two). This would
stress systems that are sensitive to the rate of warming.").
17.
Victor, supra note 2, at 324.
18.
See Reynolds, supra note 1, at 273 (noting that there is "consensus that
existing international regulation-broadly
defined-of climate engineering is
inadequate").
19.
Id.
20.
Victor, supra note 2, at 322.
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comprehensive regulation, states may unilaterally undertake
geoengineering in ways that could harm other states that may not
have consented to the geoengineering efforts. While most scholars
agree that specific geoengineering research and implementation
regulation is needed, there is no consensus as to how to accomplish
such regulation. 21 Some believe that geoengineering regulation
should be developed through existing international legal institutions,
such as the creation of a new protocol to the UNFCCC or of an
entirely new international governance structure specifically for
geoengineering. 22 Others believe norms should develop from the
23
bottom up, as to avoid "premature, poorly-crafted binding rules."
These proposals often include coordinated research efforts and a ban
24
on geoengineering research and deployment above a certain level.
US scientists have already begun advocating for a ground-up
regulation regime. In January 2017, researchers from the U.S. Global
Change Research Program (USGCRP), a US executive office that
oversees federally funded climate research, asked Congress to provide
25
The USGCRP's
funding for a geoengineering research program.
science needed
into
the
insight
research program plans to "provide[]
geoengineering
to understand pathways for climate intervention or
and the possible consequences of any such measures, both intended
and unintended." 26 In its report, the USGCRP supported the idea of
scientist-directed norm creation, noting the importance of "laying a
science and governance foundation that would allow potential future

Id. at 330-33; Reynolds, supra note 1, at 286-87.
21.
See Reynolds, supra note 1, at 273 ("The most-cited forum is the Conference
22.
of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC-COP),
which could possibly work towards a new Protocol to the UNFCCC. Others argue that
such forums would be unproductive and likely lead to stalemate or to premature,
poorly crafted binding rules."); Martin L. Weitzman, A Voting Architecture for the
Governance of Free-Driver Externalities, with Application to Geoengineering, 117
SCAND. J. OF ECON. 1049, 1064-66 (2015) (arguing for a permanent international
governance structure for geoengineering).

Reynolds, supra note 1, at 273; see Victor, supra note 2 at 331-32; see also
23.
Jesse Reynolds, The Regulation of Climate Engineering, 3 L., INNOVATION & TECH. 131
(2011) ("Some observers believe that binding regulations are not only unnecessary, but
could do more harm than good. They emphasise the present lack of knowledge and the
absence of incentives for countries with the capacity for climate engineering to endorse
a binding agreement. Furthermore, detailed constraints on behaviour now may prevent
valuable research from occurring. Instead, such writers thus recommend the
development of norms from the bottom up.").

24.
Reynolds, supra note 1, at 273.
25.
Eli Kintisch, U.S. Should Pursue Controversial Geoengineering Research,
Federal Scientists Say for First Time, SCIENCE (Jan. 9, 2017, 9:00 AM),
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/01/us-should-pursue-controversial[https://perma.cc/8Z96-95S9]
geoengineering-research-federal-scientists-say-first
(archived Oct. 10, 2017).
U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, THE NATIONAL GLOBAL CHANGE
26.
(2017),
37
UPDATE
A
TRIENNIAL
PLAN
2012-2021:
RESEARCH

https:/downloads.globalchange.gov/strategic-plan/2016/usgcrp-strategic-plan-2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z5DP-HNPW] (archived Oct. 10, 2017).

216

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OFTRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 51:211

experiments to be conducted in ethical and responsible ways." 27 The
report also noted "the need to understand the possibilities,
limitations, and potential side effects of climate intervention .

.

. with

the recognition that other countries or the private sector may decide
to conduct intervention experiments independently from the U.S.
government." 28 This push to research geoengineering from the
scientific community will help establish norms that can later
establish an international regulatory scheme, once it appears that
large-scale geoengineering projects are imminent.
This Note proposes that once sufficient norms have been
established from the ground up, geoengineering regulation should be
modeled after aspects of both marine dumping and international
genetically modified organism (GMO) trade regulations. Existing
international GMO trade regulations mandate trans-boundary
exporters of genetically modified organisms to adhere to a notification
system. They also require exporters to register all relevant
information with a clearing house. Additionally, ocean dumping
regulations provide a useful analogy because of ocean dumping's
relative ease and low cost, as well as its clear potential for harmful
transboundary impacts. A compensation system for transboundary
harms that result from unilateral geoengineering efforts should be
created to discourage states from enacting geoengineering
individually and prematurely.

II. BACKGROUND

In the last century, the average temperature of the Earth's
surface has increased by 0.78 0 C. 2 9 Climate change models predict
that global surface temperatures will continue to significantly rise
during the twenty-first century.3 0 The majority of scientists believe
that this global warming trend is mainly caused by human activities
that release greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide (C0 2) into the
atmosphere, fueled by industrialization. 31 Greenhouse gases let
sunlight into the atmosphere, but they prevent heat from exiting it,
resulting in increased global and atmospheric temperatures.3 2

27.
28.

Id.
Id.

29.
STOCKER ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (TECHNICAL SUMMARY) 37

(2013).
30.
See id. (projecting that the global surface temperature will rise between 0.5
to 3.1'F in the lowest emissions scenario and 4.7 to 8.6*F in the highest emissions
scenario).
31.
See IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 1, at 44, 47-48 (concluding that
human influence, including economic and population growth, is "extremely likely" to
have been the dominant cause of global warming since the pre-industrial era).
32.
Reynolds, supra note 1, at 3.
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Global warming presents many threats to the environment and
to humanity. Unless climate change is mitigated, Earth is likely to
continue to experience a myriad of environmental effects, including
warming temperatures, rising sea levels, changes in precipitation,
and glacial retreat. 3 Climate change is also likely to cause an
increase in extreme weather events, such as droughts, heat waves,
floods, and heavy snowfall. 34 These climate conditions might have
further-reaching consequences, potentially resulting in species
extinction, ocean acidification, lowered crop yield, food insecurity, and
rising sea levels that could render certain areas of the world
uninhabitable.3 5
Over the past twenty years, countries around the world have
come together to discuss ways to mitigate and adapt to climate
change. 36 Adaptation involves adjusting to the effects of actual or
expected climate change, while mitigation involves limiting future
climate change through "fundamental changes in the way that
human societies produce and use energy services and land." 3
Adaption and mitigation implicate different timescales: adaption has
the capacity to affect climate change risks in the near future, while
mitigation has mostly long term benefits. 3 8 Reducing human fossil
fuel consumption is a commonly discussed method of mitigation.3 9
This can be accomplished by switching to different, non-carbon
energy sources, such as wind, solar, and nuclear energy. 40 Other
frequently discussed means of mitigating climate change include
expanding forests to remove C02 from the atmosphere and making

See IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 1, at 58 ("Surface temperature is
33.
projected to rise over the 21st century under all assessed emission scenarios. It is very
likely that heat waves will occur more often and last longer, and that extreme
precipitation events will become more intense and frequent in many regions. The ocean

will continue to warm and acidify, and global mean sea level to rise.").
34.
Id. at 56, 58 (noting the current effects of climate change and that
"continued emission of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and long-lasting
changes in all components of the climate system, increasing the likelihood of severe,
pervasive and irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems").

Id. at 64-73. The report details the various regional and global future risks
35.
and impacts caused by climate change, ecosystem shifts, species extinctions, rising
ocean temperatures, and rising sea levels. The report also notes that "climate change is
projected to undermine food security" due to marine biodiversity reduction and impacts
on crop growing conditions, combined with growing food demand.
36.
Id. at 102 ("[I1nternational cooperation has helped to facilitate the creation
of adaption strategies, plans, and actions at national, sub-national, and local levels ...

A variety of climate policy instruments have been employed, and even more could be
employed at international and regional levels to address mitigation and to support and
promote adaption at national and sub-national levels.").
37.

See IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 1, at 76.

38.
39.
40.

Id. at 77.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 85.

218

[voL. 51:211

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

buildings more energy efficient. 4 1 These efforts, however, have not
spurred nearly enough progress in mitigating climate change and
reducing global warming. 4 2
More drastic action is required to reduce carbon emissions and
mitigate global warming. Geoengineering is being increasingly
considered as a temporary (or emergency) solution to mitigate rising
global temperatures. 43 The two primary methods of geoengineering
are CDR and SRM. 44 Although CDR and SRM technologies are often
grouped together, the two technologies raise different environmental
and legal concerns. CDR proposals involve directly and indirectly
removing CO 2 from the atmosphere through methods such as iron
fertilization, large-scale afforestation, and direct capture of C02 from

the atmosphere. 45 CDR proposals are relatively slow and expensive,
and they are expected to have "potentially severe land use, water, and
biodiversity consequences, as well as uncertain ecosystem impacts."46
In contrast, SRM proposals seek to reduce the amount of sunlight
absorbed in the climate system by deflecting sunlight away from the
Earth's surface or by increasing the reflectivity of the Earth's surface
and/or atmosphere. 47 There is significantly more scientific
uncertainty surrounding SRM methods, but SRM would be faster and
cheaper to implement than CDR methods. 48
Scientists emphasize that geoengineering is not meant to be a
long-term solution to climate change. 49 They assert that it only
attacks the symptoms of climate change and does not attempt to fix
its root cause (increased fossil fuel consumption).5 0 However, it is
important that regulation be put in place that allows for the safe
research of geoengineering methods, in case emergency climate
engineering action is needed at some point in the future. The United
States' rejection of the Paris Agreement in 2017 highlights the
growing need for more drastic solutions to global warming.

41.

Mitigation, NAT'L CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/

report/response-strategies/mitigation (last visited Oct. 13, 2017)
PP22-WVU4] (archived Oct. 13, 2017).
42.

[https://perma.cc/

Victor, supra note 2, at 322-36; see also IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra

note 1, at 81 ("Without additional efforts to reduce [greenhouse gas] emissions beyond
those in place, global emission growth is expected to persist.").
43.
See IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 1, at 89 (outlining possible roles,
options, and risks of geoengineering).
44.
Id.
45.
IPCC MEETING REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
46.

CRAIK & BURNS, supra note 8, at 2.

47.
IPCC Expert Meeting on Geoengineering, supranote 1, at 20.
48.
Id.; see also IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 1, at 89 (noting that SRM
is untested, but could "possibly provide rapid cooling in comparison to CO 2 mitigation").
49.

JOHN

SHEPARD

ET

AL.,

GEOENGINEERING

THE

CLIMATE:

SCIENCE,

GOVERNANCE AND UNCERTAINTY 58 (2009), https://royalsociety.org/-/media/Royal
Society-Content/policy/publications/2009/8693.pdf
[https:/perma.cc/H9KS-GC98]
(archived Oct. 21, 2017).
Id.
50.
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The social and environmental risks of geoengineering are
broad.5 1 Countries and individuals may view geoengineering as the
''easy way out," and stop taking steps to reduce carbon dioxide
emissions, the root cause of climate change. 52 States may enter
conflicts over issues of consent and control of geoengineering projects.
States may also disagree over the scale and intensity of proposed
geoengineering projects. Because SRM is relatively inexpensive, it
could be feasibly deployed by individual countries or even by wealthy
individuals or organizations.5 3
If SRM were implemented, changes in average temperature
would likely be inconsistent around the world, impacting
precipitation and potentially affecting food production in some areas
of the world. 54 Additionally, it would be difficult to research the
effects of geoengineering without conducting large-scale research,
which may have negative environmental impacts of its own. Most
significantly, if SRM efforts were to be deployed and then
discontinued, climate change would likely accelerate far beyond its
current trajectory, resulting in greater environmental damage than
humanity would have faced if geoengineering had never been enacted
at all.5 5

Jesse Reynolds, The International Legal Framework for Climate
51.
https://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/
paper,
2015),
6
(working
Engineering
(archived Nov. 5,
papers.cfm?abstractid=2586927 [https://perma.cc/79DY-C9BC]
2017); see also IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 1, at 89. If deployed, SRM could
pose

several

shortcomings

and unanticipated consequences,

including

a

modest

increase in ozone losses in the polar stratosphere. Furthermore, "if SRM were
increased to substantial levels and then terminated, there is high confidence that
surface temperatures would rise very rapidly (within a decade or two)," which would
"stress systems that are sensitive to the rate of warming." SRM also raises "questions
about costs, risks, governance and ethical implications of development and
deployment," including "spatial and temporal redistributions of risks ... introduc[ing]
important questions of intragenerational and intergenerational justice." SRM
deployment could fail a cost-benefit analysis on account of the range of its risks and
side effects. Additionally, the "governance implications of SRM are particularly
challenging, especially as unilateral action might lead to significant effects and costs
for others." IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 1, at 89.
52.
53.

IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 1.
CRAIK & BURNS, supra note 8, at 2.

Id.
54.
55.
Reynolds, supra note 1, at 272 ("Perhaps the greatest risk would be if, once
deployed, SRM were to stop for some reason, causing the climate change that would
have occurred in the absence of SRM to occur in less than a year. This very rapid rate
of climate change would cause much greater damage relative to 'normal' climate
change.").
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III. ANALYSIS: WHY EXISTING INTERNATIONAL LAW WOULD NOT
ADEQUATELY REGULATE GEOENGINEERING

A. Existing InternationalLaws
1.

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC)

The UNFCCC may implicitly sanction CDR methods of
geoengineering, but probably could not justify SRM technologies. The
UNFCCC is an international environmental treaty that entered force
on March 21, 1994 to regulate climate change. 56 The treaty carries
"broad
legitimacy"
because
of
its
"virtually
universal
membership" 5 7-197 countries are parties to the UNFCCC.5 8
Although
the
UNFCCC
does
not
explicitly
address
geoengineering, its definition of climate change likely encompasses
geoengineering. 5 The UNFCCC was enacted to achieve the
"stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at
a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic [human-caused]
interference with the climate system." 60 Furthermore, Article 4 of the
Convention requires states to "promote and cooperate" in the
conservation of the environment and could be used to support CDR.6 1
States are obligated to implement measures to mitigate and adapt to
climate change. 6 2 Article 4 also requires states to cooperate and
exchange "relevant scientific, technological, technical, socio-economic
and legal information related to the climate system and change, and
to the economic and social consequences of various response

56.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992,
1771 U.N.T.S. 165, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992) [hereinafter UNFCCC]; Daniel Bodansky,
Governing Climate Engineering:Scenarios for Analysis 13 (Harvard Project on Climate
Agreements,
Discussion
Paper
11-47,
2011),
https://www.belfercenter.org/
sites/default/files/egacy/files/bodansky-dp-47-nov-final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D9BUCRHF] (archived Oct. 21, 2017).
57.
ROBERT STAVINS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: AGREEMENTS AND
INSTRUMENTS
1005
(2014),
https://www.ipcc.chlpdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg31
ipcc.wg3_ar5 -chapterl3.pdf [https://perma.ccBC99-KU7C] (archived Oct. 13, 2017).
58.
Status of Ratification of the Convention, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE
CHANGE,
http://unfecc.int/essential-background/convention/status-of_
ratification/items/2631.php (last visited Oct. 13, 2017) [https://perma.cclLQT4-3V8K]
(archived Oct. 13, 2017).
59.
See UNFCCC, supra note 56, art. 1, ¶ 2 (defining "climate change" as "a
change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that
alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural
climate variability observed over comparable time periods").
60.
UNFCCC, supra note 56, art. 2 ("[S]uch a level should be achieved within a
time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to
ensure that food production is not threatened, and to enable economic development to
proceed in a sustainable manner.").
Id. art. 4.
61.
62.
Id. art. 4(b).
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strategies." 63 This provision would be beneficial to the geoengineering
endeavor because it would require states to share scientific
information about the consequences of geoengineering, which would
result in well thought out geoengineering efforts and reduce potential
harms.
Article
4 of the UNFCCC could potentially constrain
geoengineering efforts.64 Article 4 requires member states to "employ
appropriate methods . . . with a view to minimizing adverse effects on
the economy, on public health and on the quality of the environment,
of projects or measures undertaken by them to mitigate or adapt to
climate change." 65 This provision could constrain geoengineering
efforts because of geoengineering's potential to cause further harm to
certain environments.
Although CDR may be sanctioned implicitly by the UNFCCC,

SRM is less likely to be. The aim of the UNFCCC is to stabilize
"greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system."66 CDR involves reducing concentrations of greenhouse gases
in the atmosphere, and thus would be arguably consistent with the
ultimate objective of the UNFCCC and could one day count toward a
country's adaption or mitigation efforts.67 It is less likely that SRM
technologies would fall under the purview of the UNFCCC, because
SRM techniques would lower global temperatures, but not stabilize
greenhouse gas emission levels, and therefore would not be aligned
with the expressed goal of the UNFCCC.
The preamble of the UNFCCC also could be used as an argument
against SRM implementation. The preamble specifically refers to a
principle derived from the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, which
codified the international customary law against committing
transboundary harm. 68 SRM techniques have the capacity to effect
transboundary harm, and could therefore be limited by this
provision.6 9 However, the UNFCCC also calls for minimization of "the
adverse effects of climate change" in a rapid and inexpensive manner
"to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost," which could be
70
interpreted to allow for the implementation of SRM methods.
Ultimately, the UNFCCC does not provide a clear framework for
regulating SRM. Scholars are widely in agreement on this point,
though some have argued that a new Protocol to the UNFCCC could

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
supra note
70.

Id. art. 4(h).
Id. art. 4.
Id. art. 4(f).
Id. art. 2.
Id. art. 4(b).
Id. at preamble.
For a discussion of SRM's potential transboundary risks, see Reynolds,
1, at 272.
UNFCCC, supra note 56, art. 3.
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be established to regulate geoengineering. 7' Others have argued that
a Protocol established through an existing international legal
institution such as the UNFCCC would "be unproductive and likely
lead to stalemate or to premature, poorly-crafted binding rules."72
2.

The Kyoto Protocol

The Kyoto Protocol, which requires parties to set greenhouse gas
emissions reduction standards, would encourage CDR proposals but
would not in any way address SRM proposals. On February 16, 2005,
parties to the UNFCCC established the Kyoto Protocol within the
framework of the UNFCCC to work toward the goals outlined in the
UNFCCC.7 3 The Kyoto Protocol was ratified by all Annex I parties to
the UNFCCC besides the United States. 74 The Kyoto Protocol
requires its parties to set greenhouse gas emission reduction targets
and keep records of their actual greenhouse gas emissions, placing a
heavier burden on industrialized countries to do so. 75 The Protocol
uses registry, reporting, and compliance systems to ensure that
countries accurately monitor and report their emissions. 76 The
compliance arm of the Kyoto Protocol includes an enforcement branch
that imposes strict penalties on countries whose carbon emissions
exceed their assigned amounts.7 7 Parties deemed to be non-compliant
are declared as such and required to make up the difference between
their actual emissions and assigned emissions during the next period,
plus a deduction of thirty percent.78 Non-compliant parties are also
required to submit a compliance plan and are suspended from
emissions trading until they are reinstated.7 9
Although CDR technologies could qualify for credit under the
UNFCCC's Kyoto Protocol, SRM technologies do not contemplate the
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and therefore would not
qualify for credit under the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol would

71.
72.

See Reynolds, supra note 1, at 273.
Reynolds, supra note 1, at 273.

73.

Kyoto Protocol, U.N.

FRAMEWORK CONVENTION

ON CLIMATE CHANGE,

http://unfccc.int/kyoto-protocollitems/2830.php
(last
visited
Oct.
13,
2017)
[https://perma.ccfWFJ6-HL8C] (archived Oct. 13, 2017).
74.
Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION
ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Dec. 11, 1997), http://unfccc.int/kyoto-protocollstatus-of
ratification/items/2613.php (last visited Oct. 13, 2017) [https://perma.cc/RT4Q-MJ6D]
(archived Oct. 13, 2017).
75.
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 73.
76.
Id.
77.
An Introduction to the Kyoto Protocol Compliance Mechanism, U.N.
FRAMEWORK

CONVENTION

ON

CLIMATE

CHANGE,

http://unfccc.int/kyoto-protocol/

compliance/items/3024.php (last visited Oct. 13, 2017) [https://perma.cc/49CU-8CBE]
(archived Oct. 13, 2017).
78.
Id.
Id.
79.
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not reward other forms of global warming prevention, such as SRM,
and could even disincentivize SRM research and implementation.
3.

The Paris Agreement

While the Paris Agreement's goals could be met by CDR
methods, the agreement does not provide any justification for
implementing SRM technologies and therefore would be inadequate
to regulate SRM.80 In 2015, at the 21st Climate Change Conference of
the Parties, 195 countries adopted the Paris Agreement-the world's
first broad climate agreement-within the framework of the
UNFCCC to ambitiously mitigate and adapt to climate change.81 The
Paris Agreement was designed to "enhance[e] the implementation" of
the UNFCCC by aiming to "strengthen the global response to the
threat of climate change."8 2 The Paris Agreement is "bottom-up" in
nature, meaning that it relies on individual countries to determine
their own methods and commitment levels to achieve the overall
goals of the agreement.8 3
The parties to the Paris Agreement established a long-term goal
of holding the global average temperature increase to "well below 2 0 C
above pre-industrial levels," ideally holding the increase to 1.5oC. 8 4
The parties also agreed to establish nationally determined
contributions (NDCs) to determine their individual contributions to
the agreement's overall goal. 85 Article 3 of the Paris Agreement
requires that parties set "ambitious" NDCs that increase over time. 8 6
Parties also agreed to act with transparency, reporting to each other
and to the public about their progress toward mitigating climate
change.87

However, the NDCs set by individual countries are not binding,
and the Paris Agreement does not include mechanisms to enforce the
contributions.8 8 The lack of an enforcement mechanism has resulted
in some criticism directed towards the structure of the Paris
Agreement. A study published in Nature Magazine in 2016 concluded
that current NDCs will not lead to a temperature increase of less
than 2 0C, although the authors found the progressive requirement to

See generally CRAIK & BURNS, supra note 8 (outlining SRM technologies).
80.
U.S., China Formally Enter Climate Change Deal, CBS NEWS (Sept. 3,
81.
[https://
2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-china-enter-climate-change-deall
perma.cc/R4CW-CHUQ] (archived Oct. 13, 2017).
82.
Adoption of the Paris Agreement, art. 2, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9 (Apr.
22, 2016) [hereinafter Paris Agreement].
83.

CRAIK & BURNS, supra note 8, at 4.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Paris Agreement, supra note 82.
Id. art. 3.
Id.
Id. art. 4.
See generally id. (failing to provide for specific enforcement mechanisms).
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be promising. 89 The World Pensions Council further criticized the
Paris Agreement for resting on the assumption that countries will
voluntarily reduce their carbon pollution without any binding
enforcement mechanisms or fiscal penalties (i.e., a carbon tax).90
The Paris Agreement could provide an adequate framework for
regulating CDR, as the Paris Agreement's goals could be met by CDR
methods.9 1 Inclusion of CDR technologies as part of a country's NDC
likely would be allowed under Article 4, "which includes C02
removals as part of the mitigation commitments expected from
parties" as part of their NDCs, but would "raise concerns regarding
technological readiness and equity in effects." 92 Although the Paris
Agreement does not explicitly address geoengineering, the
Agreement's main objective of holding the global average temperature
increase to below 2 0C can likely only be met by utilizing
geoengineering technologies.93 The majority of modeled scenarios that
result in C02 levels consistent with the goal of the Paris Agreement
rely on the use of geoengineering technologies in conjunction with
emissions reductions. 94
Article 4 of the Paris Agreement does not provide any
justification for implementing SRM technologies, however. 95 Unlike
CDR, SRM envisions the injection of reflective particles into the
stratosphere, and does not implicate the removal of CO 2 from the
atmosphere. 9 6 Article 4 does not support including the injection of
reflective aerosols in the stratosphere in a country's mitigation
efforts.9 7 Nevertheless, the procedural and institutional elements of
the Paris Agreement would provide for opportunities to address the
"transparency and public deliberation" that SRM research and
implementation would likely demand.98

89.
Joeri Rogelj et al., ParisAgreement Climate ProposalsNeed a Boost to Keep
Warming Well Below 2*C, NATURE (June 30, 2016), http://www.nature.com/
nature/journal/v534/n7609/fullinaturel8307.html
[https://perma.cclU8ZW-SF4P]
(archived Oct. 13, 2017) (subscription required) (concluding that NDCs "collectively
lower greenhouse gas emissions compared to where current policies stand, but still
imply a median warming of 2.6-3.1 degrees Celsius by 2100").
90.
M. Nicolas Firzli, The Real Fight Against Emissions is Being Waged by
Markets, FIN. NEWS (Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2016-0125/un-cimate-conference-cop2 1 -laurent-fabius-carbon-emissions-calpers-calstrs

[https://perma.cc/5HW8-JZEV] (archived Oct. 13, 2017) (subscription required).
91.
CRAIK & BURNS, supranote 8, at 13.
92.
Id.
93.
Id.
94.
Id. at 1; see also T. Gasser et al., Negative Emissions Physically Needed to
Keep
Global Warming Below
20 C,
NATURE
COMM.
(Aug.
3,
2015),
https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms8958
[https:Hperma.cc/SWK9-HEQZ]
(archived Oct. 21, 2017).
95.
CRAIK & BURNS, supranote 8, at 13.
96.
See Reynolds, supra note 1, at 271.
97.
Paris Agreement, supra note 82, art. 4.
98.
CRAIK & BURNS, supra note 8, at 13.
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The lack of enforcement mechanisms in the Paris Agreement
heightens the need for goodwill and party commitment to reducing
carbon emissions. The influence of the Paris Agreement was
threatened on June 1, 2017, when US President Donald Trump
announced that the United States would be withdrawing from the
Paris Agreement." The United States will not be officially withdrawn
from the Paris Agreement until fall 2020, but President Trump's
of
administration's
lack
demonstrated
his
announcement
and
to
meeting
carbon
to
curbing
global
warming
commitment
emissions reduction targets. 100 The United States' exit poses a risk to
the future of the Paris Agreement, to the likelihood of other countries
meeting their carbon emissions targets, and to reducing global
warming more broadly. The United States' "leadership was essential"
to the Paris Agreement, and its withdrawal increases the risk that
other countries will follow suit. 10
4.

The Environmental Modification Convention

The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD)
would prohibit climate engineering used for military or hostile

-

Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. From Paris Climate
99.
Agreement, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/
climate/trump-paris-climate-agreement.html [https://perma.cc/N3BW-9BXS] (archived
Oct. 13, 2017) (subscription required).
See Mythili Sampathkumar, Donald Trump says 'something could happen
100.
14,
2017),
(July
INDEPENDENT
Paris
Agreement',
with
the
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/worldlamericas/us-politics/trump-paris-agreementmacron-france-visit-climate-change-something-could-happen-a7840021.html
[https://perma.cc/7AJK-AT8E] (archived Oct. 13, 2017); see also Anthony Janetos,
Pulling out of Paris will harm the poor in the US and abroad, CONVERSATION (June 1,
2017),
https://theconversation.com/why-trumps-decision-to-leave-paris-accord-hurtsthe-us-and-the-world-78707 [https://perma.cc/BPD6-QUVX] (archived Oct. 13, 2017)
(noting that the U.S. will likely refuse to make additional contributions to the U.N.
Green Climate Fund).
Kevin Trenberth, A race to the bottom to destroy the planet, CONVERSATION
101.
(June 1, 2017), https://theconversation.com/why-trumps-decision-to-leave-paris-accordhurts-the-us-and-the-world-78707 [https://perma.cc/BPD6-QUVX] (archived Oct. 13,
2017) ("The U.S. leadership was essential in Paris. If the U.S. does not lead by example
- and we have a moral and ethical responsibility to do so as the country that has
contributed more than any other to accumulated greenhouse gas emissions so far
then why should anyone else go along?"); see also Travis N. Rieder, Pulling out of the
1,
2017),
CONVERSATION
(June
Paris Agreement
is
unconscionable,
https://theconversation.com/why-trumps-decision-to-leave-paris-accord-hurts-the-us(archived Oct. 13, 2017)
[https://perma.cclBPD6-QUVX]
and-the-world-78707
("[A]nnouncing America's intention to withdraw from the agreement sends a clear
message to the rest of the world that the second-highest emitting nation has no
intention of doing its part to save the world's most vulnerable people from impending
harm.").
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purposes. 102 ENMOD entered force on October 5, 1978, and has
seventy-six parties, including the United States. 103 ENMOD was
enacted in response to a resolution by the US Senate encouraging an
international agreement "prohibiting the use of any environmental or
geophysical modification activity as a weapon of war" and subsequent
discussions between the United States and the USSR.1 04
ENMOD likely would not constrain geoengineering conducted for
reducing climate change.' 0 5 The Agreement explicitly states that it
"shall not hinder the use of environmental modification techniques
for peaceful purposes," and even encourages such applications. 106
Furthermore, the Agreement is essentially inactive.10 7 ENMOD did
not create standing institutions or call for its parties to meet
regularly, and no complaints have been filed under it.1 0
5.

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) could
theoretically regulate research-based SRM that takes place at sea or
that affects oceans, but would be ineffective at regulating nonresearch SRM methods. 0 9 UNCLOS was formed at the third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and entered force on
November 16, 1994.110 UNCLOS details "a comprehensive regime of
law and order in the world's oceans and seas establishing rules
governing all uses of the oceans and their resources." 1 1 It addresses
a wide range of ocean space issues, including environmental control,
marine scientific research, economic and commercial activities, and

102.
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other
Environmental Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333,
152 [hereinafter ENMOD Convention].
103.
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other
Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD), U.N. OFF. FOR
AFFAIRS,

https://www.un.org/disarmament/geneva/enmod/

Hostile Use of
1108 U.N.T.S.
Hostile Use of
DISARMAMENT

[https://perma.cc/JGR3-

YA6Y] (archived Oct. 13, 2017).
104.
Id.
105.
Bodansky, supra note 56, at 14.
106.
ENMOD Convention, supra note 102.
107.
Reynolds, The International Legal Framework for Climate Engineering,
supra note 51, at 8 ("Although ENMOD includes most industrialized countries among
its parties, it has no supporting infrastructure and is essentially dormant.").
108.
Id.
109.
For further discussion on whether UNCLOS would regulate SRM or CDR,
see Reynolds, The International Legal Framework for Climate Engineering, supra note
51, at 8.
110.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982
Overview
and
Full
Text,
U.N.
OcEANS
&
LAW
OF
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SEA,
http://www.un.org/depts/1os/conventionagreements/convention overview-convention.h

tm (last visited Nov. 5, 2017) [https://perma.cc/5ZV7-CWBK] (archived Oct. 23, 2017)
[hereinafter UNCLOS Overview].
111.
Id.
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settlement of disputes relating to ocean matters. 1 2 As of October 10,
2014, 166 states have ratified the Convention."1 3 Although the United
States has not ratified UNCLOS, it recognizes the Convention as
customary international law11 4 -UNCLOS is "the globally recognized
115
regime dealing with all matters relating to the law of the sea."
UNCLOS theoretically could govern climate engineering that
takes place at sea or that affects the oceans. Under Article 192 of
UNCLOS, countries have an obligation to "protect and preserve the
marine environment."" 6 States must balance this obligation with
their right to exploit their natural resources.11 7 However, UNCLOS
supports scientific research that does not harm the global marine
environment or interfere with other countries' use of the sea. 1s
Disputes can be settled by the International Tribunal for the Law of
9
the Sea, by the International Court of Justice, or by arbitration."1
of
methods
CDR
regulate
could
possibly
UNCLOS
geoengineering, but would not be sufficient to regulate non-research
SRM methods. UNCLOS would likely support SRM geoengineering
research.120 A "key feature" of the Convention is that all states enjoy
the traditional freedom of scientific research at sea, but are obligated
to adopt (or cooperate with other states in adopting) policies to
preserve ocean life and resources.121 Marine scientific research on a
continental shelf requires consent of the coastal state, but in most
cases the coastal state is required to grant consent to the research
when the research is conducted for peaceful purposes and fulfils
certain criteria.1 22 These features would be inadequate to regulate
SRM because SRM techniques would have uncertain consequences on
ocean life and resources, and therefore certainly could result in the

112.
Id.
Div. for Ocean Affairs & the Law of the Sea, Table recapitulating the status
113.
(2017),
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Agreements
the
and
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[https://perma.cclY7PNhttp://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/status20l0.pdf
AVUJ] (archived Oct. 23, 2017).
114.
Reynolds, The International Legal Framework for Climate Engineering,
supra note 51, at 8.
115.
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116.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 192, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 396.
117.
Meinhard Doelle, Climate Geoengineering and Dispute Settlement under
UNCLOS and the UNFCCC, in CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON OCEAN AND COASTAL
LAW: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 345 (Randall Abate ed., 2015).

118.
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51, at 8.
UNCLOS Overview, supra note 110.
Jesse Reynolds, Climate EngineeringField Research: The Favorable Setting

of InternationalEnvironmental Law, 5 WASH & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIM. & ENVIRON. 417,

456 (2014).
121.
UNCLOS Overview, supra note 110.
122.
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harm of the global marine environment. 123 Additionally, the impacts
of SRM would likely be experienced by states other than the coastal
state.1 24
B. Unique Challenges of Regulating Geoengineering
Geoengineering does not fit cleanly into any pre-existing
international environmental treaties. This is mostly due to its novelty
and unknown effects. The fact that both major geoengineering
approaches (CDR and SRM) could cause further harm to the
environment and to humans presents a challenge for its regulation.1 25
The potentially uneven impacts of geoengineering on weather
patterns and precipitation levels also presents a challenge to
regulators. While geoengineering models demonstrate that SRM
could stabilize global temperatures and precipitation levels, they also
suggest that "it may not be feasible to stabilize the climate in all
regions simultaneously using solar-radiation management," making
"consensus about the optimal level of geoengineering difficult, if not
impossible, to achieve."1 26
Geoengineering also involves a different economic structure than
most of the actions regulated by environmental law.' 27 Most actions
regulated by international environmental law involve "negative
externalities with the environment as their medium." 128 Activities
that positively affect individual actors but negatively impact others or
the environment fall into this category. Reducing greenhouse gas
emissions also requires overcoming a collective action problem,
because one actor's greenhouse gas emissions affect other actors
globally as greenhouse gases "accumulate over time and mix."1

29

on the other hand, involves positive
Geoengineering,
externalities because countries and individuals other than the
implementing actor would likely experience the geoengineering
effort's positive impacts.1so The reduction of climate change would not

Reynolds, The International Legal Framework for Climate Engineering,
-

123.

supra note 51, at 8.

124.
Id.
125.
Victor, supra note 2, at 323 ("The option of geoengineering is riddled with
danger. All the most promising geoengineering methods have likely side effects that
are worrisome. The unknown harms from large-scale tinkering with the planet could be
even more grave than the predictable effects.").
126.
Katharine L. Ricke et al., Regional Climate Response to Solar-radiation
Management, 3 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 537, 537-41 (2010).
127.
Reynolds, The International Legal Framework for Climate Engineering,
supra note 51, at 4.
128.
Id.
129.
Weitzman, supra note 22, at 1050; see also IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra
note 1, at 76.

130.
Reynolds, The International Legal Framework for Climate Engineering,
supra note 51, at 5.
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be entirely captured by the implementing actor-other people or
countries would share the benefits, resulting in a "free rider"
collective action problem.' 3 1
Geoengineering also presents an opposite problem: because of its
32
low cost, it requires "free drivers" to exercise collective restraint.1
Given SRM's inexpensive nature, a country believing itself to be in
imminent danger could unilaterally launch a geoengineering effort,
potentially harming other regions of the world in the process. 133
While an SRM regulatory framework must address traditional
environmental legal problems such as preventing and compensating
others for harm, SRM's ease of enactment demands a regulatory
and
"coordination, mutual restraint,
system that addresses
prevention of misuse."1 34
The fact that geoengineering can be enacted unilaterally with
for
its
unique challenges
"planetary effect" also presents
regulation. 135 Geoengineering is markedly different from efforts to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the method of reducing global
temperatures contemplated by the UNFCCC and the Paris
requires
greenhouse
gas
emissions
Agreement.
Reducing
36
less
country's
(much
One
to
be
effective.1
cooperation
international
one person's) efforts to do so will not be nearly enough to enact
meaningful change or meaningful harm. 137 The fact that
geoengineering can be enacted by a single actor in ways that likely
will have widespread, disparate effects presents challenges to its
regulation.' 3 8
In addition, the lack of norms regulating geoengineering will
make it difficult to create a regulatory structure. A system that
regulates geoengineering must create norms and principles that
restrain actors. 139 The first step to this system will be further
research of possible geoengineering methods and the dangers they
present. 140 These norms may be essential to determining when
geoengineering technologies should be used, how harmed parties

131.
Id; Weitzman, supra note 22, at 1049-68 (Weitzman coined the term "freedriver" in relation to geoengineering).
132.
Reynolds, The International Legal Framework for Climate Engineering,
supranote 51, at 5; Weitzman, supra note 22, at 1049-68.
133.
Weitzman, supra note 22, at 1050.
134.
Reynolds, The International Legal Framework for Climate Engineering,
supra note 51, at 5.

135.
Victor, supra note 2, at 328.
136.
IPCC SYNTHESIs REPORT, supra note 1, at 102.
137.
Id. ("[E]ffective mitigation will not be achieved if individual agents advance
their own interests independently, even though mitigation can also have local cobenefits.").
138.
Victor, supra note 2, at 324 (theorizing that a single nation, or even a "lone
Greenfinger, self-appointed protector of the planet and working with a small fraction of
the Gates bank account," could justify and fund an effort on their own).
139.
Id.
140.
Id.
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should be compensated, if and how enactment costs should be shared,
and how to maintain geoengineering efforts once they are enacted. 14 1
Generally norms are negotiated, codified, and enforced by
treaties.1 42 However, treaties are "inherently conservative" because
the negotiation process ensures that countries only commit to the
extent that they believe is practical and do not join treaties that they
believe to be a risk.14 3 Professor David Victor predicts that if a treaty
on the regulation of geoengineering were to be negotiated today, the
majority of countries would support an outright ban on
geoengineering because most countries do not have the capability to
unilaterally geo-engineer.1 44 Thus, the creation of a treaty should
wait until geoengineering is more thoroughly researched and norms
are created from the bottom up. Thorough geoengineering research
will involve actual geoengineering deployment, which will present
vast risks of its own.

IV. SOLUTION
Given how little scientists currently know about geoengineering,
it would be imprudent to strictly regulate geoengineering in the form
of a multilateral treaty at this time. Scientists, and, by extension,
decision makers, do not yet know its form, the distribution or full
extent of its risks and benefits, the reversibility of its effects, or if
states would be willing to subject themselves to its risks. 145
Additionally, it is unlikely that countries would be able to reach a
consensus on the contents of such a treaty in the near future, given
the absence of knowledge surrounding geoengineering. Furthermore,
it is unlikely that countries that have the capacity to conduct
geoengineering unilaterally would sign on to a treaty banning
geoengineering.1 46 A ban on geoengineering would probably not be
adhered to and could have the dangerous effect of actors pursuing
geoengineering research without being bound by safety guidelines.1 47

141.
Id. at 330.
142.
Id. at 331.
143.
Id.
144.
Id.
145.
Id. at 325, 334.
146.
See id. at 331 (noting that while only a handful of countries have the
territory size and reliable lift systems to unilaterally conduct geoengineering, these
countries would likely refuse to join a treaty that banned geoengineering); Reynolds,
supra note 1, at 285-86 (arguing that geoengineering is unlikely to be regulated by a
binding international agreement at all, as states with the power to enact
geoengineering research, as well as states that are particularly at risk of the adverse
effects of climate change, would not sign such an agreement).
147.
See Victor, supra note 2, at 325; see also Bodansky, supra note 56, at 22
("[A] moratorium could thus have the perverse effect of leaving the field of
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The current state of geoengineering research is not suited to a
consensus-oriented regulation process. 148 Given these factors,
scholars have suggested that regulating geoengineering via a
multinational treaty at this point in time would be ill-fated. 149
Although the traditional method of norm creation "looks to the
treaty system to negotiate, codify, and enforce norms," geoengineering
norms should be created from the bottom up, meaning that unrelated
research bodies should regulate geoengineering through norm
creation. 150 Norms are necessary to ensure that geoengineering
research is not undertaken prematurely or undertaken without
adherence to scientifically established principles. Norms also are
needed to determine who can conduct geoengineering, to determine
when and where geoengineering should take place, and to develop a
compensation system for harmed parties.
I
The primary source of geoengineering norm creation should come
from groups of scientists (geoengineers) funded by both states and
private funding groups. Governments have already begun to earmark
funds to research geoengineering.' 5 In early 2017, the U.S. Global
Change Research Program recommended that Congress pursue
geoengineering research. 152 Geoengineering researchers will be in the
best position to set geoengineering research standards going
forward. 153 Often researchers are the strongest proponents of
regulation and "best positioned within their governments to press for
complementary efforts within pivotal nations."1 54
The processes and results of geoengineering research should be
transparent and accessible to ensure that future geoengineers will
adhere to the norms established by the initial group of researchers.' 5 5
Additionally, researchers should meet frequently with one another to
discuss their results and further solidify norms. The data collected
geoengineering research to the less responsible countries that ignore the moratorium
and engage in riskier activities.").
148.
See Bodansky, supra note 56, at 22 (arguing that instead, small groups
supported by active research programs should share competing assessments).
149.
See id. ("A much better approach would be an active geoengineering
research programme, possibly including trial deployments, that is highly transparent
and engages a wide range of countries that might have (or seek) geoengineering
capabilities. That approach would be designed to explore the safest and most effective
options while also socializing a community of responsible goeengineers.").
150.
Id. at 331; see also Reynolds, supra note 1, at 273-74; Victor, supra note 2,
at 332 (both suggesting a "bottom-up" approach to norm-building).
151.
Eli Kintisch, U.S. Should Pursue Controversial Geoengineering Research,
SC. MAG. (Jan. 9, 2017), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/01/us-should-pursuecontroversial-geoengineering-research-federal-scientists-say-first

[https://perma.cc/AU9K-QRED] (archived Oct. 23, 2017).
152.
Id.
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Victor, supra note 2, at 330 ("Academies of science are probably the best
place to begin the process because they are usually well connected to the setting of
research priorities and political decision-making.").
154.
Id. at 332.
155.
Id.
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through these initial research endeavors will allow countries to create
domestic geoengineering regulations. 156 Researchers will eventually
become experts in the field of geoengineering, further solidifying
norms and leading the way for their codification in a multinational
treaty.
One problem presented by bottom-up norm creation is that it
does not preemptively provide a framework for harm compensation or
regulation of large geoengineering efforts likely to cause
transboundary effects. One way to deal with this problem would be
for national governments to domestically regulate the process of
geoengineering research. For example, states could create mandatory
research boards to approve privately undertaken geoengineering
projects, and require absolute transparency when such projects are
carried out. Given its cost, geoengineering research likely will be
publicly funded and supervised by governments. Still, countries
should develop domestic regulations that control the process (but not
major
before
research
of geoengineering
substance)
the
geoengineering research projects are undertaken in order to best
prevent large-scale harm.
Once geoengineering norms are adequately developed, codifying
them into a multinational treaty or protocol to an existing treaty will
be much easier and more likely to garner support. Eventually a treaty
that regulates both the process and substance of geoengineering will
be necessary given the scale of its potential. A treaty will allow
parties to create a cohesive regulatory structure based on developed
norms and ensure that geoengineering research is conducted as safely
as possible. A treaty could also gather and distribute information
regarding geoengineering research, facilitate cooperation between
governments (and punish governments for noncompliance), and push
states to overcome the collective action problem. 157 A new protocol to
8
the UNFCCC would be a natural fit for this treaty. 15
This Note looks to GMO trade regulation and ocean dumping
regulation for guidance and ideas to incorporate in a future strict
multinational treaty. While the substantive regulations of
geoengineering should be developed from the ground up, aspects of
these multinational treaties provide inspiration for the future
regulation of geoengineering.

156.
Id.
157.
LASSE RINGIUS, RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL AT SEA 50 (MIT Press 2000);
see also Bodansky, supra note 56, at 19-20.
158.
See Bodansky, supra note 56, at 20 (stating that several commentators
have suggested that the UTNFCCC is the appropriate forum for regulating
geoengineering due to its large membership and ability to consider geoengineering
alongside emissions mitigation).
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A. Analogy to InternationalGMO Trade Regulation

'

There are two major international protocols that address the
transboundary movement of genetically modified organisms: the
Cartagena Protocol of 2000 and the Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur
Supplementary Protocol of 2010, both of which are attached to the
1993 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). 5 9 The CBD entered
force on December 29, 1993 and has 196 parties; it was not signed by
the United States. 160 The CBD was created with the objective of
promoting the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use
of components of biological diversity, and the fair and equitable
sharing of the benefits arising from the use of genetic resources. 1 6
The internal regulation of GMOs differs from country to country.
Lumpur
Nagoya-Kuala
Protocol and the
The
Cartagena
Supplementary Protocol apply only to transboundary actions, not to
internal use, consumption, or passage of GMOS within states.1 62 The
United States regulates GMOs in a relatively relaxed manner, while
the European Union has some of the strictest GMO regulations in the
world.163
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LIBRARY
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international-protocols.php#_ftn1 (last visited Nov. 5, 2017) [https://perma.cclSH5WPBPX] (archived Oct. 23, 2017) [hereinafter InternationalProtocols].
List of Parties, Convention on Biological Diversity, https://www.cbd.int/
160.
information/parties.shtml (last visited Nov. 5, 2017) [https://perma.cc/MCJ9-6WTD]
(archived Oct. 23, 2017).
Convention on Biological Diversity art. 1, June 5, 1995, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79.
161.
InternationalProtocols, supra note 159.
162.
163.
See DIAHANNA LYNCH & DAVID VOGEL, THE REGULATION OF GMOs IN
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES: A CASE-STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN
REGULATORY POLITICS, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (2001), https://www.cfr.org/

[https://perma.cc/ZRY5-KEEQ]
report/regulation-gmos-europe-and-united-states
(archived Nov. 4, 2017) (comparing regulations in the United States with regulations in
the European Union). EU member states have individual rules and regulatory agencies
that govern GMOs. In addition, companies seeking to sell GMOs in an EU country
must first obtain permission from that country. If approved, the company must notify
other countries via the European Commission. If a member state objects, then the
European Commission conducts additional evaluations, and the request is resubmitted
to vote. The EU's extremely cautious and restrictive approach to GMOs is rooted in
several economic and political reasons. Limiting the sale of GMOs protects domestic
agricultural business. In addition, anti-GMO lobbying groups have significantly
influenced European politics and policymaking. Anti-GMO public sentiment has led to
rising consumer demand for GMO-free food products. These factors have resulted in
the EU having the world's most restrictive GMO policy. This strict scheme has delayed
the development of modern biotechnology and stalled research in the EU. Id.; see also
Wendan Wang, International Regulations on Genetically Modified Organisms: U.S.,
Europe,
China and
Japan, FOOD
SAFETY
MAG.
(June/July
2016),
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The Cartagena Protocol became effective on September 11, 2003.
It has 171 parties; the United States is not a member. 164 The Protocol
aims to protect biological diversity and human life from GMOs, while
acknowledging the potential of GMOs to increase food supply.1 6 5 The

Protocol was based upon the precautionary principle, which embodies
"environmental action in the face of scientific uncertainty," but it does
not impose substantive regulations on parties. 166 The precautionary
principle encourages taking cost-effective measures to prevent
imminent environmental damage, even when there is not scientific
certainty that the measures would work. 167 The Protocol provides
several mechanisms for regulating the international transportation of
GMOs, including an advanced notification and permission system for
intentional and accidental international GMO movements, as well as
a clearing house to facilitate information sharing. 168 Although the
Protocol does not penalize parties for improperly transmitting GMOs,
it encourages parties affected by such transmissions to request
payment from the offending party under the principle that polluters
must pay for the damage they cause.1 69
The Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol was
adopted on October 15, 2010 and has been ratified by forty
countries. 170 It has not been signed by the United States. 171 The
Supplementary Protocol was created to address the problem of
transboundary damage caused by international GMO trade.17 2 The

164.

Parties to the Protocoland Signature and Ratification of the Supplementary

Protocol, CONVENTION

ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/parties/

(last visited Nov. 6, 2017) [https://perma.cclK35Z-L73Z] (archived Oct. 23, 2017)
[hereinafter Partiesto the Protocol].
165.
Id.; see also Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on
Biological Diversity art. 1, Jan. 29, 2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208, 39 I.L.M. 1027
[hereinafter Cartagena Protocol] ("[O]bjective of this Protocol is to contribute to
ensuring an adequate level of protection in the field of the safe transfer, handling and
use of living modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology that may have
adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking
also into account risks to human health, and specifically focusing on transboundary

movements.").
166.
See Cartagena Protocol, supra note 165; Meinhard Schroder, Precautionary
Approach/Principle, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

(Rildiger Wolfrum ed., 2014); International Protocols, supra note 159 (citing Ren6
Lefebar, The Legal Significance of the Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol:
The Result of a Paradigm Evolution (Ctr. for Envtl. Law & Sustainability Research
Paper No. 2012-02, Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2012-87, 2012)),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2151282 [https://perma.cclYK6H-VRK3] (archived Oct. 23,
2017)).
167.
InternationalProtocols,supra note 159.
168.
Id.
169.
Id.
170.
Partiesto the Protocol, supra note 164.
171.
Id.
172.
The Supplementary Protocol defines "damage" as "an adverse effect on the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account risks
to human health," that . . . "is measurable or otherwise observable taking into account,
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Supplementary Protocol is grounded in the polluter pays principle,
although it is not clear whether liability extends to the state of origin
or just the person or organization responsible for the damage.1 7 3
Parties to the Supplementary Protocol agree to implement its
provisions, which "provide for prompt, adequate and effective
response measures in the event of damage caused by the
transboundary movement of living modified organisms," into
domestic law. 174
Though not perfectly analogous, international GMO trade and
geoengineering pose similar risks. While GMO trade may be easier to
regulate from the perspective of the importing country, both GMO
trade and geoengineering have the potential to threaten a non-acting
country's biodiversity and food supply. Adverse effects resulting from
the transboundary transfer of GMOs may still occur despite
preventative measures. 175 The development and use of GMOs is
considered by some to be inherently dangerous, especially in light of
its relatively unknown nature. 176 Additionally, like geoengineering,
its long-term effects cannot be assessed without extensive research
(i.e., deployment).1 7 7 The international transfer of GMOs presents a
significant risk of causing transboundary harm to both public and
private goods, including economic loss, environmental damage, and
harm to human health.1 78
Several aspects of the Cartagena Protocol and its Supplementary
Protocol could be incorporated into future geoengineering regulations.
Although the overall GMO regulatory scheme should not be applied
to geoengineering, certain aspects of it, including the mandatory
notification system, clearing house, approval to conduct experiments,

wherever available, scientifically-established baselines recognized by a competent
authority that takes into account any other human induced variation and natural
variation" . . . and "significant." The Supplementary Protocol provides a list of factors to
use when determining whether an adverse fact is "significant," including whether it
causes permeant or long-term change that will not be naturally recovered in a
reasonable amount of time, the extent of qualitative or quantitative changes that
adversely affect biological diversity, the reduction of the ability of components of
biological diversity to provide goods and services, and the extent of adverse effects on
human health. Article 2. Use of terms, Kuala- Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on
Liability and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, CONVENTION ON
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY,

http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/nkl/article2/

(last visited Nov.

7,

2017) [https://perma.cclT33R-YS7Y] (Archived Oct. 23, 2017).
173.

See InternationalProtocols, supra note 159.

174.
Lefebar, supra note 166.
175.
Id.
176.
Id.
177.
Id. ("The introduction of a new technology to an activity tends to carry a
higher risk, because the long-term effects cannot be assessed before gaining experience
with that technology.").
178.
Id. (noting that this is especially true for the transfer of living modified
organisms, and that "[sluch damage may manifest itself as traditional damage to
private goods . . . It may also take the form of damage to public goods, notably the
environment and human health").
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and polluter pays principle would lend themselves well to regulating
geoengineering.
1.

Notification System

The Cartagena Protocol requires actors moving GMOs across
state borders to obtain advance informed agreement from the
importing state.17 9 This means that states are given advance notice of
any movement of GMOs into their territory.18 0 States then have 270
days to decide whether to allow the transit and what conditions to
impose if they approve the shipment.' 8 If a GMO is accidentally
moved across a border, and if that movement would "have significant
adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity," the offending party must notify any affected states,
relevant international organizations, and the Biosafety Clearing
House.' 82
This mandatory notification system would be useful for
geoengineering.
States undertaking geoengineering
regulating
research or projects should be required to notify other states party to
the multinational agreement of any geoengineering projects above a
predetermined scale. Because it may be difficult to conclude if and
how much trans-boundary harm has occurred, a future multinational
treaty should mandate transparency in geoengineering research.
Furthermore, researchers should work together to catalogue the
effects of geoengineering around the world, not just in the enacting
country. Countries should also form internal agencies to which
researchers should be mandated to report all geoengineering research
to ensure that all research efforts are accounted for and reported.
2.

Clearing House and Risk Management Mechanisms

The Cartagena Protocol established a mandatory Biosafety
Clearing House designed to "facilitate the exchange of scientific,
technical, environmental and legal information on, and experience
with, living modified organisms," as well as to assist parties
(especially developing states) in implementing the Protocol.' 8 3 Parties
are required to provide the Clearing House with summaries of their
risk assessments of GMOs as generated by their regulatory
processes. 184 The Clearing House also provides access to other
85
international biosafety information exchange mechanisms.1

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Cartagena Protocol, supra note 165, arts. 6-8.
Id. arts. 6--8.
Id. art. 10, § 3.
Id. art. 17, § 1.
Id. art. 20.
Id. art. 20.
Id. art. 20.
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The Protocol also details a risk management plan, requiring
parties to "establish and maintain appropriate mechanisms,
measures and strategies to regulate, manage and control risks
identified in the risk assessment provisions of this Protocol." 186
Additionally, parties must observe GMOs for a specified period of
time before putting them to their intended uses.18 7
A mandatory clearing house would further facilitate the
transparency required to enforce geoengineering norms. Mandatory
information sharing will enable cooperation among states. States
should eventually be required to provide a geoengineering clearing
house with their risk assessments.
3.

Approval to Conduct Experiments

In some countries, including China and New Zealand,
researchers must obtain permission from their governments before
conducting experiments involving genetic engineering or the
production of certain GMOs. 188 In the United States, genetically
modified plants, pesticides, animals, drugs, and biological products
are subject to premarket government approval. 189 Because
geoengineering research efforts will probably require federal funding,
it is likely that domestic geoengineering research will be federally
approved before it is undertaken. However, it would be beneficial for
countries to require geoengineering efforts to be approved from a
national body to prevent affluent individuals from unilaterally
enacting geoengineering.
Requiring approval from a multinational regulatory group and
ethical committee would ensure that wealthier states refrain from
enacting geoengineering at the cost of developing states, who do not
have the resources to unilaterally fund geoengineering research. A
mandatory clearing house and risk management mechanism would
ensure that the international regulatory board is aware of all risks of
transboundary harm, and would help protect poorer nations. The
regulatory board should be made up of members from states both
likely and unlikely to enact geoengineering to ensure that only the
most utilitarian projects approved.

186.
Id. art. 16.
187.
Id.
188.
Restrictions on Genetically Modified Organisms, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
9,
2018)
(last visited Jan.
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/restrictions-on-gmos/
[https://perma.cclV5XM-SY48] (archived Jan. 9, 2018).
189.
Restrictions on Genetically Modified Organisms: United States, LIBRARY OF
(last visited
CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/restrictions-on-gmos/usa.php/
Jan. 9, 2018) [https://perma.ccVR6U-UJFX] (archived Jan. 9, 2018).
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Polluter Pays Principle

The Cartagena Protocol does not include penalties for the illegal
(knowing) transboundary transmission of GMOs.19o The treaty leaves
it to states to "adopt appropriate domestic measures aimed at
preventing and, if appropriate, penalizing [illegal] transboundary
movements." 191 The Protocol allows parties affected by illegal
transmissions to ask the party of origin to pay for the disposal of the
improperly transmitted GMOs. 192 The Protocol also requires these
cases to be reported to the Biosafety Clearing House.1 9 3
The Nagoya-Kula Lumpar Supplementary Protocol was enacted
in 2010 to solve the question of who pays for GMO-caused
damages. 194 Rene Lefeber, co-chair of the group that facilitated the
negotiations of the Supplementary Protocol, could have been
describing geoengineering when he described the need for the
Supplementary Protocol: "Since adverse effects may occur in spite of
risk-management measures or as a result of the failure to identify the
risk of adverse effects, the allocation of the costs of such effects should
be anticipated and regulated."i95 The Supplementary Protocol has
only been ratified by eleven parties, however, and parties' reluctance
to ratify a strict damages regime demonstrates that it may be difficult
to convince states to do the same in the case of geoengineering. 196
However, its principles are worth discussing.
The Supplementary Protocol stands for the proposition that a
GMO polluter must pay for any damage caused.1 97 It is not clear
whether this applies only to the individual or organization
responsible for the polluting activity, or if liability extends to the
state in which the activity occurred.19 8 For the polluter pays provision

190.
Cartagena Protocol, supra note 165, art. 25.
191.
Id.
192.
Id.
193.
Id.
194.
Press Release, Convention on Biological Diversity, The Nagoya-Kuala
Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety
(Oct.
16,
2010),
http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/nkl-pressrelease.shtml
[https://perma.cc/5YF9-GMXE] (archived on Oct. 23, 2017); Text of Nagoya-Kuala
Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the CartagenaProtocol on
Biosafety,
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Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress, CONVENTION
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to apply, causation between the damage incurred and the GMO must
be established.199
Parties to the Supplementary Protocol must require the
individuals responsible for damages to "immediately inform the
authorities, evaluate the damage, and take appropriate response
measures." 200 The authorities must identify the individual or
organization that caused the damage and determine the appropriate
response. 2 0 An assessment as to whether damage is likely or unlikely
must be based on scientific information, including data collected by
202
the Biosafety Clearing House.
The differences between transboundary GMO trade and
geoengineering may make some of these features difficult to
implement in future multinational geoengineering regulation. GMO
trade involves private actors, whereas geoengineering likely will be
carried out mainly by public actors. Additionally, the harm caused by
allowing the transboundary movement of GMOs can be contained if it
is spotted, whereas it is uncertain if the harm resulting from
geoengineering will be containable or reversible at all.
Proving the causation and damages pieces necessary to receive
compensation will also be difficult. The existence of transboundary
harm as a result of geoengineering would take years to discover or
may never be discovered or attributed to geoengineering at all.
Proving that geoengineering caused a specific harm will also be
problematic. It may be difficult to say with any level of certainty
whether a geoengineering effort is directly responsible for reduced
crop yield or increased flooding. These issues of causation and
damages likely will be litigated if a country alleges the existence of
transboundary harm as a result of geoengineering.
Despite this, a polluter pays principle-with liability extended to
states-incorporated into future geoengineering regulation could
encourage states to exercise caution when enacting geoengineering
research and deployment. Codifying the polluter pays principle would
also encourage states to collaborate in geoengineering efforts to
spread the cost of damages should the geoengineering effort cause
effective
if
regulation
would
be particularly
harm.
The
geoengineering projects approved by a board associated with the
multinational agreement received exemption from liability. This
would encourage countries to abide by the permit process and would
ensure that only thoroughly vetted geoengineering projects are
approved.

199.
200.
201.
202.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. Analogy to Ocean Dumping Regulation
Ocean dumping is the disposal of chemical, industrial, or
radioactive waste, trash, munitions, sewage sludge, or contaminated
dredge material into the ocean. 203 Ocean dumping shares a key
feature with geoengineering in that its effects are transboundary and
therefore is regulated by domestic, regional, and international
conventions. Ocean dumping negatively affects people around the
world who rely on the ocean and its ecosystem for food. 204 Dumping
contaminants in one part of the ocean can affect individuals who live
thousands of miles away if they consume food that has been
contaminated by the dumping. 205 Additionally, toxic chemicals
20 6
dumped in the ocean can wash up on shore, harming the public.

In 1972, the United States passed the 1972 Marine Protection,
Research and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA).2 07 MPRSA was enacted in
response to previous damage caused by ocean dumping. 208
Uncontrolled dumping contaminates areas of the ocean with harmful
pollutants and causes a severe depletion of oxygen in other parts.2 09
Disposal of waste into the ocean damages the marine environment
and natural resources and poses risks to human health.2 1 0 MPRSA
regulates the disposal of waste in US marine waters. 211 Title I of the
MPRSA contains permit and enforcement provisions, while Title II
regulates marine research. 212
The MPRSA was enacted at the same time as the central
international ocean dumping treaty, the Convention on the
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter of 1972 (the London Convention), and the two are very

203.
Learn About Ocean Dumping, U.S. ENVT'L. PROTECTION
https://www.epa.gov/ocean-dumping/learn-about-ocean-dumping#importance

AGENCY,
(last

visited Nov. 5, 2017) [https://perma.cc/4S95-6TN8] (archived Oct. 23, 2017).
204.
Id.
205.
Id.
206.
Id.
207.
Id.
208.
Id.
209.
Id.
210.
Id.
211.

(2010).
212.

CLAUDIA COPELAND, OCEAN DUMPING ACT: A SUMMARY OF THE LAW 2

Learn About Ocean Dumping, supra note 203.
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similar.2 1 3 There are eighty-seven parties to the London Convention,
including the United States. 214
In 1996, parties to the London Convention created a new,
freestanding treaty called the London Protocol, which was designed to
more proactively protect the marine environment. 215 The London
Protocol, which added a compliance mechanism, prohibits all forms of
ocean dumping, except for a few exceptions on the "reverse list."2 16

The Protocol requires parties take a precautionary approach to
preventing harm caused by marine dumping. 217 Only forty-eight
states are party to the Protocol. 218 The United States signed but did
not ratify the London Protocol, most likely because it found the
requirements of the London Protocol to be too stringent.2 1 9
Both geoengineering and ocean dumping implicate the "free
driver" problem to some degree. 220 Geoengineering will only be
undertaken unilaterally if the actor believes he or she will benefit,
but such action will likely harm others globally. Similarly, ocean
dumping breeds positive results for the dumper (they rid their ship of
waste) but negatively affects the global marine environment.
Geoengineering and ocean dumping do have their differences.
The economic incentive structures faced by the two are different:
geoengineering would likely only be undertaken in an emergency,
while ocean dumping is born out of laziness and the desire to rid the
ship of weight. Additionally, the two present different levels of shortterm risk to the environment and to humanity, though the long-term
risk is arguably equivalent.
Geoengineering involves both positive and negative externalities,
while ocean dumping implicates only negative externalities. Both the
benefits and the harms caused by geoengineering could be
experienced by non-acting states. Third parties do not enjoy a benefit
of ocean dumping, but share equally in its costs. To curb ocean
dumping, individuals must put the common good over their
individual desires to rid themselves or their ships of waste.
Additionally, geoengineering involves a "risk-risk" tradeoff, in
which the risk of executing wide-spread geoengineering efforts is

of

213.
Id.; see also Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping
ORG.,
http://www.imo.org/en/
MAR.
Other Matter, INT'L
Wastes
and

OurWork/Environment/LCLPfPages/default.aspx
(archived Oct.
[https://perma.cc/8YDY-VVZ9]
Convention].

5,
2017)
(last visited Nov.
23, 2017) [hereinafter London

214.
Ocean Dumping: International Treaties, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
(last visited
https://www.epa.gov/ocean-dumping/ocean-dumping-international-treaties

Nov. 5, 2017) [https://perma.ce/5ST5-W8AF] (archive Oct. 23, 2017).
215.
Id.
216.
Id.; see also London Convention, supranote 213.
217.
London Convention, supra note 213.
218.
Id.
219.
Ocean Dumping: InternationalTreaties, supra note 214.
220.
See supraPart I.
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balanced with the risk of allowing global warming to continue
unchecked. Ocean dumping is not undertaken to mitigate some other,
greater risk. There is no positive global outcome that can arise from
has tremendous
however,
Geoengineering,
dumping.
ocean
global
benefit.
for
possibilities
Despite these differences, aspects of the MPRSA and the London
Convention and Protocol, including a permit system and a research
and monitoring program, would be valuable tools in the future
international regulation of geoengineering.
1.

Permit System

The permit system outlined in Title I of the MPRSA provides
useful lessons for geoengineering regulators. MPRSA prohibits all
ocean dumping in US territory without a permit. 221 Permits for
dumping certain materials that are not altogether banned can be
applied for and are issued by the EPA. 222 The EPA must provide
notice and comment opportunities once it decides that the proposed
dumping will not unreasonably harm the marine environment,
human health, or the economy. 2 23 MPRSA authorizes the EPA to fine
violators up to USD 50,000 for violating the permit requirement. 224
MPRSA also authorizes criminal penalties and injunctive relief for
22 5
knowing violations of the act.

As norms develop, states could establish permit systems at the
domestic level to ensure that wealthy individuals do not unilaterally
conduct geoengineering research without adequate vetting from their
domestic governments. 226 Once geoengineering norms are established
from the bottom up, a multinational treaty addressing geoengineering
could establish a permit system. Enacting permit-less geoengineering
projects could result in fines or increased liability for damages,
although enforcement of this provision may be difficult. The permit
board should be comprised of people from countries with and without
the capacities to unilaterally enact geoengineering.
2.

Research and Monitoring Program

Title II of MPRSA directs US agencies to conduct research on the
general marine environment and ocean dumping.2 27 The National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is mandated to

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

COPELAND, supra note 211, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
See Victor, supra note 2, at 324 (discussing the "Greenfinger" problem).
COPELAND, supra note 211, at 4.
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research the long-term effects of ocean dumping and other human
caused events on general ocean resources. 22 8 The EPA is directed to
conduct research specifically with the end of ocean dumping of
sewage sludge and industrial wastes in mind. 229 The MPRSA also
authorizes nine regional marine research bodies to monitor marine
conditions in those regions. 230
A research and monitoring system at the domestic level could be
implemented to facilitate the norm creation process. All
geoengineering research at the domestic level should be logged,
documented, and discussed among scientists to establish norms and
adherence to them. Once large-scale geoengineering research efforts
are deployed, states should direct internal agencies to conduct specific
research on the various effects of the deployment. This long-term
monitoring will be very important to the geoengineering effort, as
quantifying the actual effects of geoengineering on different regions of
the world will likely be more difficult than measuring the amount of
pollutants in a specific area of the ocean.

V. CONCLUSION
While geoengineering should eventually be internationally
regulated to manage its transboundary risks, a regime to regulate
geoengineering must be established from the ground-up. Although
geoengineering has the potential to cause significant trans-boundary
harm, premature multinational geoengineering regulations enacted
before norms are established will be inadequate. States with the
capacities to unilaterally enact geoengineering will not agree to the
terms of a hasty treaty. Once norms are established, reaching a
consensus on the terms of the international regulation will be easier.
Domestic research and monitoring boards should be transparent
with geoengineering research data and share their findings with
researchers around the world to help establish norms. States can ban
geoengineering research efforts above a certain scale and collect and
distribute geoengineering data to guide future geoengineering
experiments and governance.
While it is too early to envision a comprehensive international
regulatory scheme, this Note looks to features of international GMO
trade and ocean dumping regulations for inspiration as to what
future international geoengineering regulation could look like. A
future multinational geoengineering regulatory regime could
incorporate a permit system to ensure that only thoroughly vetted
geoengineering projects are approved. It could also include a

228.
229.
230.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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notification system with a notice and comment period to ensure all
parties to the future treaty can comment on the proposed
geoengineering. An international research board should be
established to gather and distribute geoengineering data.
A future multilateral treaty should also incorporate the polluter
pays principle. The polluter pays principle already has some traction
in customary international law and will ensure that those who are
harmed by geoengineering will be compensated. Once more is known
about geoengineering and large-scale geoengineering is close to being
undertaken, a compensation system for trans-boundary harm that
results from unilateral geoengineering efforts should be created to
discourage states from enacting geoengineering unilaterally and
prematurely.
Several issues remain, however, including the burden of proof,
causation, and quantifying damages. 231 Additionally, enforcing a
strict liability polluter pays regime may disincentivize geoengineering
to the point that no single actor will want to undertake it, and it may
prevent countries able to unilaterally fund geoengineering from
agreeing to treaties with strict liability regimes. These problems can
be mitigated by exempting permitted geoengineering plans from
liability. This would encourage states to join the multilateral treaty
and abide by the permitting process. Eventually, geoengineering
projects could be carried out multilaterally to spread the costs of
enactment and liability.
These principles and institutions should be established at the
domestic level in the near future, as geoengineering research is
imminent. In the spring of 2017, Harvard University launched a solar
geoengineering research program to test SRM aerosols and methods,
improve understanding of the health and climate risks associated
with geoengineering, and develop governance theories for its testing
and deployment. 232 The program's launch has sparked mainstream
debate over the merits and risks of geoengineering. Despite its

231.
Chen-Ju Chen, The Liability and Compensation Mechanism under
International
Marine
Environmental
Law
(May
2012),
https://www.law.berkeley.edulfiles/Chen-final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R83P-X39A]
(archived Oct. 23, 2017) (conference paper from the Law of the Sea Institute at UC
Berkeley and the Korea Institute of Ocean Science and Technology Conference, held in
Seoul, Korea).
232.
Arthur Neslen, US scientists launch world's biggest solar geoengineering
study, GUARDIAN

(Mar. 24,

2017), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/

mar/24/us-scientists-launch-worlds-biggest-solar-geoengineering-study
[https://perma.cclH6JB-F47T] (archived Oct. 23, 2017); Overarching Goals, HARVARD'S
SOLAR

GEOENGINEERING

RES.

PROGRAM,

https://geoengineering.environment.

harvard.edu (last visited Nov. 7, 2017) [https://perma.cclRBQ9-QPGH] (archived Oct.
23, 2017) ("The largest challenge for social geoengineering is not the technology itself,
but rather the governance of its testing and possible deployment in a divided,
multipolar world.").

2018]

245

REGULATING GEOENGINEERING

potential pitfalls, geoengineering may very well be the only way to
keep global warming from rising more than 2oC.
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